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Abstract
This paper examines the presence of a political cycle in Australian daily stock returns over the forty-seven years
from 6 January 1958 to 30 December 2005. The period selected includes nineteen federal elections, twenty-five
ministries and five terms of Liberal-National or Labor government. The political cycle is defined in terms of the
party in power, the time since the last election and election information effects. The market variables are defined
in terms of nominal and real returns and nominal and real return volatility. The results indicate returns are
highest during the ministries of Holt-McEwen and Hawke and lowest during Whitlam and Fraser, while risk is
highest during Whitlam and Hawke and lowest during Menzies and Holt-McEwen. However, regression analysis
shows that Liberal-National and Labor governments more generally differ in the volatility of returns where
political cycle-sourced return volatility increases at a decreasing rate with the time in power. Such risk
differences potentially arise from the different parties’ economic and social policies, uncertainty among investors
about these policies, or doubt among voters concerning future election outcomes.
JEL classification: G14; C12
Keywords: presidential puzzle; political cycle; risk and return; election surprises

1 Introduction
Anecdotal evidence abounds of the link between securities markets and politics. In the
financial media, most economic and social policy is analysed concerning possible market
reactions, and industry and consumer groups comment on anticipated and hoped for changes
in policy. At election time, politicians are frequently accused of pork-barrelling, with firms
and investors alike anticipating the heady mix of tax breaks, consumption and production
subsidies and fiscal and monetary stimulation that accompanies changes in the political party
in power. At the same time, parties are routinely pigeon-holed as pro- or anti-business and
pro- or anti-investor, reflected in some way in the flow and source of political donations.
At least three empirical questions arise from such observations. First, does market
behaviour differ when governments are drawn from different political parties? That is, is
stated ideology reflected in actual policy, and does this systematically vary in its influence on
market participants. Second, is this political influence constant or changing with the ebb and
flow of mandated terms in office and efforts to secure re-election? Put differently, is ideology
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or any form implemented in a different way in business and investor policy at the beginning
of terms of an office that at the end? Finally, if the differences in markets are taken as given,
do markets react suddenly with the announcement of elections results, or are expectations
developed more gradually with the benefit of political comment and opinion polls?
The purpose of this paper is to add to this intriguing body of work the results of an analysis
of the Australian federal political cycle and its impact on the Australian equity market. To the
author’s knowledge this is the first work of its kind in Australia. The paper itself is divided
into five main areas. Section 2 briefly reviews the relevant literature. Section 3 provides a
snapshot of recent Australian political history. Section 4 explains the empirical methodology
and data collection employed in the analysis. Section 5 presents the results. The paper ends
with a brief conclusion.

2. Literature review
The analysis of political cycles in stock market returns has been almost exclusively
conducted in the United States, and therein the context of presidential elections. Part is
generic, to the extent that institutional rigidities in the political cycle – mandated terms in
office for example – impose structure upon market returns. Herbst and Slinkman (1984), for
example, examined the period from 1926 to 1977 and found a 48-month cycle during which
returns were higher than average, peaking in November during presidential elections.
Likewise, Huang (1985) used data from 1832 to 1979 and discovered that stock returns were
systematically higher in the last half of a political term than in the first, as did Hensel and
Ziemba (1995), though with small and large-caps only. On this basis, Hensel and Ziemba
(1995) suggested that “…these findings are consistent with the hypothesis that political reelection campaigns create policies that stimulate the economy and are positive for stock
returns”.
But the larger part of this research focuses on differences in political ideology and the
differential impact of the political cycle on stock returns. Herein the focus of interest is on the
apparent preference of the market for right-of-centre presidents (i.e. Republicans).
Niederhoffer et al. (1970), for instance, showed that US stock market movements around
election dates were consistent with a pro-Republican bias on Wall Street, though evidence
was not forthcoming on any longer-term relationship between Republican presidents and
stock returns. Similarly, Riley and Luksetich (1980) concluded that the market prefers
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Republicans, and the market tends to rise following presidential elections. Dobson and
Dufrene (1993) extended this analysis outside of the United States, concluding that in equity
market terms US presidential elections invoke significant structural changes, with
international markets becoming more highly correlated. Other studies concerning the posited
positive market effect of Republican presidencies have been undertaken by Allvine and
O’Neil (1980), Hobbs and Riley (1984), Foerster and Schmitz (1997), Johnson and
Chittenden (1999), Booth and Booth (2003) and Bohl and Gottschalk (2005), while Nordhaus
(1975), MacCrae (1977), McCallum (1978), Hibbs (1977), Beck (1982a; 1982b), Havrilesky
(1987), Alesina and Sachs (1988) and Haynes (1989) address business cycles more broadly.
Most recently, Santa-Clara and Valkanov (2003) have re-examined the ‘presidential
puzzle’ sometimes arising in this research: that is, real returns are higher under Democratic
presidents, contradicting the conventional wisdom that Republicans are good for markets in a
manner unexplained by considerations of risk. Using data since 1927, Santa-Clara and
Valkanov (2003) found average excess returns for value-weighted market indexes over threemonth Treasury bills of about 2 percent under Republicans and 11 percent under Democrats.
Further, a decomposition of returns revealed that the difference was due to real market returns
being 5 percent higher under Democrats and real interest rates almost 4 percent lower.
Responding to the question of whether the difference in average returns was due to a
difference in expected (a Democratic risk premium) or unexpected (surprises in the economic
policies of the party in the presidency) returns, Santa-Clara and Valkanov (2003) concluded
that presidential parties capture variations in returns that are largely uncorrelated to what is
explained by business cycle fluctuations, and hence must be associated with systematic
differences in political policies.
Outside of the United States, the United Kingdom and New Zealand are the only
other national contexts known for the analysis of political cycles in stock returns. These are
interesting in that while these have a two-party system in common with the United States
(Labour and Conservative (Tory), Labour and Nationals, respectively), unlike the United
States, the prime minister (leader of the Executive) is always controls the dominant party in
the elected house (House of Commons, House of Representatives). For this reason, and as in
Australia, there is a clearer connection between the political ideology of the elected party and
the implementation of economic policy. In New Zealand, Cahan et al. (2005) concluded that
the presidential puzzle was reversed, and that New Zealand market returns were lower under
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left-leaning Labour governments than under National party governments. This lay at odds
with parallel analysis that suggested that market risk was actually higher under the former.
In the United Kingdom, Manning (1989) showed that British Telecom shares, though not
the market as a whole, reacted to opinion polls surrounding the 1987 General Election in the
face of impending nationalisation, while Peel and Pope (1983), Gwilym and Buckle (1984)
and Thompson and Ioannidis (1987) examined the connection between the stock market and
business support for Tory (Conservative) governments. But most recently, Hudson et al.
(1998) found that while short-term price movements reacted to opinion polls in the run-up to
and including elections, there was no statistically significant evidence of a difference in
nominal or real returns between Tory and Labour governments.

3. Recent Australian political history
Two groups dominate the Australian political spectrum at the federal level. The first is a
conservative coalition of parties made up of the Liberal Party and the Nationals (including the
Country Liberal Party). Collectively, these are known as the Coalition. The second comprises
a single social democratic party, the Australian Labor Party. There have been fifty-nine
ministries since Federation in 1901, with the Coalition and its antecedents accounting for
thirty-eight (64 percent) and the Labor Party twenty-one (36 percent).
Originally formed by the merger of the Protectionist and Free Trade parties in 1910, the
Liberal Party has undergone several reformations – including as the Nationalist Party in the
late 1910s and 1920s and the United Australian Party in the 1930s and early 1940s –
culminating in its present-day incarnation founded by Sir Robert Menzies in 1944. The
Liberal Party is regarded as a centre-right party and broadly represents the interests of
business, the suburban middle classes and urbanised regions. Since the October 2004 election,
the Liberals account for seventy-four of the one hundred and fifty House of Representatives
seats (47 percent), and from July 2005, thirty-two of the seventy-six seats in the Senate (42
percent).
The Nationals are a conservative party that traditionally represent rural and regional
interests. Originally known as the Country Party, it has held seats in the federal parliament
since 1919. While the party has witnessed the steady erosion of its rural support base in recent
years, it still holds the balance of power for the Coalition with twelve seats in the House of
Representatives (16 percent) and six in the Senate (8 percent). It is joined by the Country
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Liberal Party, which is the representative of both parties in the Northern Territory, holding a
single seat in both House of Representatives and the Senate.
The opposing party active at the federal level is the Australian Labor Party, a centre-left
party founded by the trade union movement in 1890 [by providing for the direct affiliation of
trade unions, the Australian Labor Party is most like labour parties in the UK and New
Zealand, and less like progressive parties such as the Democrats in the United States (ALP
2006)]. Historically, support for either the Coalition or the Labor Party was viewed as class
based, with the middle class supporting the Coalition and the working class supporting Labor.
In recent years, this has been a less important factor: in the 1970s and 1980s Labor gained a
significant bloc of middle class support and the Coalition enjoyed some working class
support. Indeed, part of the current electoral success of the Coalition is attributed to its appeal
to disaffected working class Labor voters. The Labor Party has endured a number of
debilitating splits in its long history, most notably with Prime Minister Billy Hughes and the
conscription debate during WWI leading to the creation of Nationalist Labor in 1917, and the
formation of the anti-communist Democratic Labor Party in 1955. It currently accounts for
sixty seats in the House of Representatives (40 percent) and twenty-eight in the Senate (37
percent).
Parties other than these have enjoyed limited success in Australia. These currently include
the Australian Greens, a left-wing environmental party, and the Australian Democrats,
middle-class centrists – both with four seats in the Senate – and Family First, a Christianinfluenced party appealing to social conservatives with one Senate seat. In the past, the minor
parties have also included the centrist Democratic Labor Party from the mid-1950s until the
mid-1970s and the rightist One Nation party during the 1990s. The proportional
representation system often allows minor parties to win seats in the Senate and, on occasion,
the balance of power, but they have usually been unable to win seats in the House of
Representatives given its electorate-based preferential voting system, along with the
nationwide dominance and broad based appeal of the Coalition and Labor parties.

4. Research method and data
Table 1 provides details of the nineteen federal elections held since 6 January 1958. All
information is drawn from the Australian Electoral Commission (2006a; 2006b). Five distinct
political periods are noted, with the Coalition in power from 1958 to 1972 (five prime
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ministers and five winning elections), 1975 to 1983 (one prime minister and three elections)
and 1996 to 2005 (one prime minister and four elections) and the Labor Party in power from
1972 to 1974 (one prime minister and two winning elections) and again from 1983 to 1996
(two prime ministers and five elections). This information is used to define the political cycle
variables in this analysis. The first political variable specified in this analysis is a dummy
variable that takes a value of one on days the Coalition is in power and zero otherwise (Ct)
while the second takes a value of one if the Labor Party is in power and zero otherwise (Lt).
Within this broad division, different samples are defined representing the twenty-five
prime ministerial terms. In most cases, the starting and ending dates for these terms are
defined by two of the nineteen elections during the period (with allowance for a transition
period of a few days) with the following exceptions: Menzies was re-elected out-of-sample in
1955 and resigned in 1966, replaced by Holt; Holt disappeared while swimming, presumed
dead, in 1967 and replaced by McEwen; Gorton was overturned in a party room vote in 1971
and replaced by McMahon; Whitlam was sacked by Governor-General Sir John Kerr in 1975
with Fraser taking a caretaker role until an election was held one month later; Hawke was
overturned by Keating in a party room vote in 1991; and Howard is the currently serving
prime minister. The separate prime ministerial terms are then aggregated by prime minister
with Menzies, Hawke and Howard serving four terms; Holt, Gorton, Whitlam and Keating
two terms; and McEwen and McMahon one term. Because McEwen governed for just twentythree days and McMahon never successfully contested an election, they are included with
Holt and Gorton, respectively.
The next two political variables are included to take account of whether the return on
equities varies across the term in office. Rather than using dummy variables to identify
whether a day falls in, say, the first or second half of the period in office as in Hudson et al.
(1998), a continuous variable is specified as a simple linear trend (Tt) taking a value of one on
the first trading day in office, two on the second day, and so on. This variable is reset at the
beginning of the next government’s term in office. The square of this variable (St) is also
included to take account of any non-linear relationships between the political cycle and
market returns. Two additional dummy variables are defined to take account of election
effects on market returns. The first of these takes a value of one for each day of the trading
week (Monday to Friday) before the election date (Saturday) (Bt), and zero otherwise, while
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the second takes a value of one for each day of the trading week following the election (At)
and zero otherwise.
The market data employed in the study are closing prices from the Australian Stock
Exchange (ASX) over the period Monday 6 January 1958 to Friday 30 December 2005. This
sample encompasses 12,067 trading days and represents the longest period for which daily
data is available. The capitalization-weighted All Ordinaries Price Index is used. The index
includes the top ASX-listed stocks by capitalization, covering about 92 percent of domestic
companies by market value. To be included in the index, stocks must have an aggregate
market value of at least 0.02 percent of all domestic equities, and maintain an average
turnover in excess of 0.5 percent of quoted shares each month. The long-term index includes
base recalculations by Global Financial Data (2006).
A series of daily nominal returns are calculated where Rtn = 100 ln(Pt Pt −1 ) where Pt is the

index level on day t. The daily real return is also calculated Rtr = 100 ln (Pt Pt −1 .it ) where it is
the daily rate of increase in the consumer price index as defined by the Australian Bureau of
Statistics’ (2006) retail/consumer price index (1945 = 100) and all other variables are as
previously defined. Finally, a simple measure of the daily volatility of both the nominal and
real return series is calculated using the standard deviation of rolling one-month period
returns. Santa-Clara and Valkanov (2003) suggest that differences in risk may arise across
presidential terms (Democrats and Republicans) because of differences in economic policies,
or from varying levels of uncertainty among investors about these policies. In this manner,
“…it would be reasonable to argue that it [higher realised returns] should command a risk
premium to compensate investors for the greater risks incurred in those periods” (Santa-Clara
and Valkanov 2003: 1867).

The method used in this analysis to calculate volatility is

identical to Santa-Clara and Valkanov (2003). As an alternative, Cahan et al. (2005) estimated
return volatility with the absolute value of returns.
Two approaches are used to test the political cycle hypotheses. The first involves a
descriptive analysis of the mean daily returns and tests of equality of means using parametric
analysis. As a rule, the mean return for Coalition governments is expected to be higher than
the mean return for Labor governments. Further, it is hypothesised that returns one week
before and after elections may be higher or lower than returns during the same political term,
but the direction may be dependent upon whether the election comprises a shock. Santa-Clara
and Valkanov (2003: 1863), for example, argued that “…if the observed difference in returns
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is due to a difference in expected returns, the change in the level of the market at the time that
the information is revealed should be quite large”.
The second approach used is a regression-based approach where the 12,067 daily nominal
and real returns are regressed separately against the political cycle variables:
Rt = β 1C t + β 2 Lt + β 3Tt + β 4 S t + β 5 Bt + β 6 At + ε t

(1)

where Rt is the nominal or real Monday to Friday market return at time t, Ct is a dummy
variable that equals one for a Coalition government and zero otherwise, Lt is a dummy
variable that equals one for a Labor government and zero otherwise, Tt and St are political
cycle time trends, Bt and At are election effects, βi are coefficients to be estimated and ε is the
error term. Following the hypotheses presented, the sign on the coefficient for Ct is expected
to be positive and larger in magnitude than Lt, the sign on Tt is expected to be negative. The
hypothesised sign of St may be positive or negative, depending upon whether the political
cycle trend in returns and volatility increases at an increasing or decreasing rate. Two
additional regressions are also specified for risk where:
Vt = β 1C t + β 2 Lt + β 3Tt + β 4 S t + β 5 Bt + β 6 At + ε t

(2)

where Vt is the nominal or real return volatility and all other variables are as previously
defined. The first null hypothesis tested is:
H 0 : β1 = β 2 = β 3 = β 4 = β 5 = β 6 = 0

(3)

against the alternative that at least some β ≠ 0 . The second null hypothesis tested is:
H 0 : β1 = β 2

(4)

against the alternative H 1 : β 1 ≠ β 2 . If the first null hypothesis is rejected, then the market
returns and/or risk exhibit a form of political cycle, related to either the party in power and/or
the tenure of power and/or election effects. If the second is rejected, then the parties have a
differential impact upon market returns and/or risk.

5. Empirical results
The daily market returns and return volatility are plotted in Figure 1. Table 2 presents the
summary of descriptive statistics for the daily nominal and real returns. These are categorised
according to the separate ministries over the sample period: namely, Menzies, Holt-McEwen,
Gorton-McMahon, Whitlam, Fraser, Hawke, Keating and Howard. Liberal-National refers to
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the combined Menzies, Holt-McEwen, Gorton-McMahon, Fraser and Howard governments.
As shown in Table 2, mean nominal returns are highest during Holt-McEwen (0.0651) and
Hawke (0.0509) and lowest during (Whitlam (-0.0556) and Menzies (0.0245), while real
returns are highest during Holt-McEwen (0.0562) and Hawke (0.0323) and lowest during
Whitlam (-0.0889) and Fraser (0.0066). The nominal and real volatility of returns (as
measured by standard deviation) is highest during Whitlam (1.1632 to 1.1629) and Hawke
(1.1376 to 1.1375) and lowest during Menzies (0.4553 to 0.4556) and Holt-McEwen (0.5308
to 0.5307).
By and large, the distributional properties of the nominal returns series during these
ministries appear non-normal. Given that the sampling distribution of skewness is normal
with mean 0 and standard deviation of

6 T where T is the sample size, then returns during

Menzies (-1.320), Gorton-McMahon (-0.145), Hawke (-7.994) and Howard (-0.680) are
significantly negatively skewed, indicating the greater likelihood of observations lying below
the mean, while returns during Holt-McEwen (0.240), Whitlam (0.257) and Fraser (0.322) are
significantly positively skewed. The kurtosis or degree of excess across all returns is mostly
large, indicating leptokurtic distributions with many extreme observations: Menzies (19.506),
Holt-McEwen (5.402), Gorton-McMahon (4.519), Whitlam (7.035), Fraser (4.973), Hawke
(190.08) and Howard (8.278). Kurtosis during Keating (0.597) is less than three, indicating a
platykurtic or thin-tailed distribution with few extreme observations. Given the sampling
distribution of kurtosis is normal with mean 0 and standard deviation of

24 T where T is

the sample size, then all estimates are once again statistically significant at any conventional
level.
Figure 2 graphs the annualised nominal return for each of the twenty-five prime ministerial
terms since 1958. Clearly, there is again much variation in the annual returns experienced
under the various prime ministers, ranging between -11 percent for Whitlam II and +53
percent for McEwen (albeit with a very short sample period). Augmented Dickey-Fuller and
Phillips-Peron tests (with allowance for autocorrelation) (not shown) for the nominal and real
return and nominal and real return volatility series all reject the null hypothesises of a unit
root at the .01 level and we conclude that the return series are stationary and suitable for
regression-based analysis.
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5.1 Parametric tests of mean return differences

At first impression, there appears to be some evidence of a political cycle effect in the
Australian stock market. Certainly, returns appear to vary across the various prime ministries,
whether aggregated by prime minister (Table 2) or by individual ministry (Figure 2). Returns
and risk also appear to differ by political affiliation. As shown in Table 2, the mean daily
nominal (real) return for Liberal-National governments is 0.0307 (0.0187) compared to
0.0269 (0.0089) for Labor governments. Risk appears higher during Labor governments with
a nominal (real) standard deviation of returns of 1.0542 (1.0543) for Labor governments
compared to 0.7115 (0.7117) for Liberal-national governments. However, while Levene’s test
of equality of variances is rejected for nominal (statistic = 225.293, p-value = 0.0000) and real
(statistic = 224.293, p-value = 0.0000) returns, indicating unequal risk, it fails to be reject the
null hypothesis of the equality of means (columns 8 and 9 in Table 2) assuming unequal
variances. This indicates that risk (standard deviation) is significantly higher for Labor
governments in Australia, but there is no significant difference in returns between LiberalNational and Labor governments in the last forty-seven years. However, returns are
significantly lower during the (Labor) prime ministry of Whitlam (1972-1975).
Table 2 also presents the means and tests of equality of means for the trading week before
and after the election during each ministry. The purpose is to test for the presence of an
election effect. However, only during Keating are returns (both nominal and real)
significantly higher in the week before the election (columns 12 and 13) and only during
Whitlam are returns significantly lower in the week following an election (columns 16 and
17). The latter appears consistent with the (negative) information effects associated with
Whitlam outside of the immediate election period. With the former, Keating contested just
two elections: the first (winning) election in 1993 (“the sweetest victory of all”), was a
surprise with a Coalition victory widely predicted; the second (losing) election was associated
with the highest Liberal-National two-party preferred vote since 1977. In both cases, there
was a general perception of a change in government with the defeat of a deeply unpopular (at
least from the business perspective) incumbent.
5.2 Regression-based analysis of the political cycle and election effects

The estimated coefficients and standard errors of the parameters detailed in (1) and (2) are
presented in Table 3. Four separate regressions with four different regressands are included:
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nominal returns and nominal return volatility, real returns and real return volatility. The
regressors for the four regressions are common. The independent variables are dummy
variables for Liberal-National and Labor governments, a political term trend and its square,
and dummy variables for the week before and after a federal election. Breusch-Godfrey
Lagrange multiplier and White’s heteroskedasticity tests are initially used to test for higherorder serial correlation and heteroskedasticity in the least squares residuals, respectively. The
null hypothesis of no serial correlation is rejected in all cases and we may conclude the
presence of higher-order serial correlation in the residuals. The null hypothesis of no
heteroskedasticity in the least squares residuals is also rejected. All standard errors and pvalues in Table 3 incorporate Newey-West corrections for heteroskedasticity and
autocorrelation of unknown form.
Once again, the signs on the estimated coefficients initially appear to offer some support
for the posited influence of political cycles on market returns. In terms of returns, the
coefficient on Liberal-National is always positive and higher than Labor. However, only for
nominal returns are the estimated coefficients both significantly different from zero; with real
returns, only the coefficient for Liberal-National is significant. But in either case, the Wald
tests (column 12) fail to reject the null hypotheses that the coefficients are equal. The trend
and the trend square term and the before and after election terms offer fleeting support for a
political cycle and election effect in that their coefficients are of the hypothesised sign, but in
no case are they significant. That said, the null hypotheses of the joint insignificance of the
coefficients for both return regressions are rejected (column 11) and we confirm that the
political cycle and effect variables jointly influence mean returns.
However, the regressions for nominal and real return volatility (risk) present quite different
results. As before, there is no evidence of a market effect immediately before or after an
election: the information content of elections themselves appears limited. But return volatility
is always significantly higher for Labor governments than Liberal-National governments, by
about a quarter of one percent on any day. This is a similar result to Cahan et al. (2005) who
also found that market risk was higher under the left-leaning Labour government in New
Zealand. At the same time, return volatility is seen to increase, though at a decreasing rate,
over the time in office. The magnitude of the increase in return volatility is very small,
however, increasing by only about one-fifth of a percent during the typical parliamentary term
of three years. Importantly, this increase in volatility with the political term in office is
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common to both Liberal-National and Labor governments. As before, the null hypothesis of
the joint insignificance of the coefficients is rejected and we may conclude that the political
cycle jointly influences return volatility (risk) in the Australian stock market.

6. Concluding remarks
The present study employs parametric analysis to test for a political cycle in the Australian
stock market. A comparison of mean returns provides some empirical evidence to support the
conjecture that returns depend upon the government in power. There is limited support for an
election effect where returns are systematically higher or lower in the period leading up to ot
immediately following an election. Any apparent differences are lessened when returns are
expressed in real rather than nominal terms. Similar results are obtained with a regressionbased analysis.
However, return volatility is significantly higher under Labor governments than LiberalNational governments. This is problematic in that with any difference in the riskiness of the
market across political parties, it is reasonable to argue that the market should command a risk
premium to compensate investors for the greater risks incurred. Certainly, abundant evidence
exists elsewhere of a positive relation between the expected risk premium and the predictable
level of volatility. Why then do investors appear to require no such compensation under Labor
governments in Australia?
One possibility is that a large and persistent difference in risk unmatched in return cannot
exist in an efficient market, but can in an inefficient one. Investors may perceive the Labor
Party in power as a noisy signal of economic and social policy. Given the relatively small
number of Labor ministries during the sample, investors may never really systematically
understand the influence on stock prices. And in many cases, past experience offers little
guidance. For example, compare the radical social non-market reforms of Whitlam with the
pro-market deregulation and microeconomic reform undertaken during the Hawke-Keating
period. In this general setting, stock volatility reflects diffuse and easily changed beliefs about
future political behavior, but on balance, these views are never systematically ‘bad’ or ‘good’
over extended periods of time.
Another possibility follows suggestions by Beaulieu (2005) that investors may not simply
require a premium for domestic political risk. This suggests the presence of some form of
diversification on the part of domestic investors or the exercise of real options by businesses.
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For example, firms may bring forward or delay investment projects given current policies:
only a marginal net effect on future expected cash differs. This may in be aided, in part, by the
fact that political horizons are short and investment horizons can be long.
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Table 1
Australian federal elections, governments, prime ministers and leaders of the opposition, 1958-2005
Election
date

Turnout

Vote

Elected
party or coalition

22 Nov 1958
9 Dec 1961
30 Nov 1963

95.44
95.22
95.71

54.10
49.50
52.60

26 Nov 1966

95.13

56.90

25 Oct 1969

94.96

49.80

2 Dec 1972
18 May 1974

95.38
95.40

47.30
48.30

13 Dec 1975
10 Dec 1977

95.40
95.08

55.70
54.60

18 Oct 1980

94.35

50.40

5 Mar 1983
1 Dec 1984
11 Jul 1987
24 Mar 1990

94.64
94.17
93.84
95.32

46.77
48.23
49.17
50.10

13 Mar 1993

95.75

48.56

2 Mar 1996
3 Oct 1998
10 Nov 2001

95.77
94.99
94.85

53.63
49.02
50.95

Liberal–National
Party of Australia

9 Oct 2004

94.32

52.74

Liberal–Nationals

Prime Minister

Menzies, Robert
Liberal–Country
Party

Holt, Harold
McEwen, John
Gorton, John
McMahon, William

Start of
term

19 Dec 1949

End of
term

Opposition
party

Australian Labor
26 Jan 1966 19 Dec 1967 Party
19 Dec 1967 10 Jan 1968
10 Jan 1968 10 Mar 1971
10 Mar 1971 5 Dec 1972
Liberal–Country
5 Dec 1972 11 Nov 1975
Party

Whitlam, Gough

Liberal–Country
Party

Fraser, Malcolm

11 Nov 1975 11 Mar 1983

Hawke, Robert

11 Mar 1983 20 Dec 1991

Australian Labor
Party

Australian Labor
Party

Liberal–Country
Party

Howard, John

20 Dec 1991 11 Mar 1996

11 Mar 1996

Start of
term

End of
term

Evatt, Herbert

20 Jun 1951

9 Feb 1960

Calwell, Arthur

7 Mar 1960

8 Feb 1967

Whitlam, Gough

8 Feb 1967

5 Dec 1972

26 Jan 1966

Australian Labor
Party

Keating, Paul

Opposition
leader

–

Australian Labor
Party

Snedden, William
Fraser, Malcolm

20 Dec 1972 21 Mar 1975
21 Mar 1975 11 Nov 1975

Whitlam, Gough

27 Jan 1976 22 Dec 1977

Hayden, William
Hawke, Robert

22 Dec 1977 3 Feb 1983
3 Feb 1983 11 Mar 1983

Peacock, Andrew

11 Mar 1983

5 Sep 1985

Howard, John
5 Sep 1985 9 May 1989
Peacock, Andrew
9 May 1989 3 Apr 1990
Hewson, John
3 Apr 1990 23 May 1994
Downer, Alexander 23 May 1994 30 Jan 1995
Howard, John
30 Jan 1995 11 Mar 1996
Beazley, Kim

19 Mar 1996 22 Nov 2001

Crean, Simon
Latham, Mark
Beazley, Kim

22 Nov 2001
2 Dec 2003
28 Jan 2005

2 Dec 2003
18 Jan 2005
–

Source: Australian Electoral Commission (2006a; 2006b). Notes: The Australian Parliament consists of two houses, the Senate – selected by voters within a state and the House of Representatives – selected by voters within an electorate. The party or coalition of parties that has a majority in the House of Representatives (of
which the Prime Minister and Leader of the Opposition are normally part) forms the Government. Voting is compulsory with elections always held on a Saturday.
The maximum length until a House of Representatives election is held is three years from the first sitting day of the current Parliament plus up to sixty-eight days
of adjustments for the issuance of writs, close of nominations, etc. Senators are elected for six year terms on a rotating basis with half of the Senators retiring every
three years. If there is a ‘double dissolution’ all Senators and Members of the House of Representatives face election as in 1973, 1975, 1983 and 1987. Vote is the
two-party preferred vote for the Liberal-Country/National Party coalition. The Country Party changed its name to the National Country Party in the 1970s, then to
National Party in the 1980s, and finally to The Nationals in 2003.
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Figure 1
Daily nominal returns and return volatility

Year

Notes: Sample period Monday 6 January 1958 to Friday 30 December 2005. Figures show daily returns (lefthand side axis) and daily return volatility (right-hand side axis). Volatility is measured as the rolling one-month
standard deviation of returns.

Figure 2
Annual nominal returns by prime ministerial term
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Hawke I 1983-1984

Fraser III 1980-1983

Fraser II 1977-1980
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Menzies IV 1963-1966
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Notes: Figure shows the annualised nominal return using daily data for each prime ministerial term from 1958 to 2005. Australian
Labor Party governments are indicated with a darker shade. The number of prime ministerial terms shown (25) exceeds the number
of parliamentary terms as distinguished by elections (21) because of replacement of the prime minister during office: Menzies
resigned in 1966 and was replaced by Holt, Holt went missing, presumed dead in 1967 and was replaced by McEwen, Gorton was
overturned in a party room vote in 1971 and was replaced by McMahon, Hawke was overturned in a party room vote in 1991 and
was replaced by Keating.

Table 2
Comparison of daily returns by government and before and after elections, Monday 6 January 1958 to Friday 30 December 2005
In-government
returns

Government

Std. dev

Days

Mean

Returns and tests of equality of means
one week before election

Std. dev

t-statistic

p-value

Mean

Returns and tests of equality of means
one week after election

Std. dev

t-statistic

p-value

Mean

Std. dev

t-statistic

p-value

Nominal returns

Mean

Tests of equality
of means

Menzies
Holt-McEwen
Gorton-McMahon
Whitlam
Fraser
Hawke
Keating
Howard
Liberal-National

2003
488
1231
733
1846
2220
1068
2478
8046

0.0245
0.0651
0.0247
-0.0556
0.0342
0.0509
0.0337
0.0295
0.0307

0.4553
0.5308
0.8284
1.1632
0.8198
1.1376
0.7495
0.7614
0.7115

10064
11579
10836
11334
10221
9847
10999
9589
4021

0.0305
0.0280
0.0300
0.0350
0.0286
0.0246
0.0290
0.0295
0.0269

0.8986
0.8519
0.8428
0.8159
0.8452
0.7587
0.8498
0.8608
1.0542

0.4422
-1.4674
0.2143
2.0763
-0.2700
-1.0353
-0.1742
-0.0015
-0.2088

0.6584
0.1428
0.8304
0.0382
0.7872
0.3006
0.8617
0.9988
0.8346

0.1103
0.0019
-0.1146
-0.1349
0.2702
0.0396
0.5058
0.0602
0.1075

0.3501
0.2009
0.8176
0.4471
1.1465
0.9432
0.5014
0.8359
0.8330

-0.7331
0.2672
0.5337
0.1528
-0.9513
0.0383
-2.0038
-0.1569
-0.7268

0.4636
0.7894
0.5936
0.8786
0.3527
0.9695
0.0453
0.8754
0.4700

0.0199
0.2024
-0.1146
-0.8886
0.2040
-0.0821
-0.1048
0.0272
0.1165

0.4954
0.1683
0.8176
1.5077
1.8738
0.7606
1.1753
0.8748
1.1526

0.0387
-0.5811
0.5337
2.1670
-0.3986
0.4692
0.3755
0.0115
-0.5647

0.9691
0.5614
0.5936
0.0306
0.6948
0.6390
0.7159
0.9908
0.5744

Real returns

Days

Out-of-government
returns

Menzies
Holt-McEwen
Gorton-McMahon
Whitlam
Fraser
Hawke
Keating
Howard
Liberal-National

2003
488
1231
733
1846
2220
1068
2478
8046

0.0191
0.0562
0.0133
-0.0889
0.0066
0.0323
0.0274
0.0229
0.0187

0.4556
0.5307
0.8285
1.1629
0.8198
1.1375
0.7494
0.7615
0.7117

10064
11579
10836
11334
10221
9847
10999
9589
4021

0.0148
0.0138
0.0157
0.0222
0.0171
0.0117
0.0143
0.0136
0.0089

0.8987
0.8520
0.8430
0.8159
0.8453
0.7590
0.8499
0.8609
1.0543

-0.3166
-1.6773
0.0955
2.5465
0.5034
-0.8158
-0.4844
-0.4913
-0.5335

0.7516
0.0940
0.9240
0.0111
0.6147
0.4147
0.6281
0.6232
0.5937

0.1058
-0.0061
-0.1268
-0.1734
0.2396
0.0222
0.4998
0.0535
0.0928

0.3503
0.2010
0.8182
0.4471
1.1470
0.9403
0.5016
0.8349
0.8319

-0.7404
0.2637
0.5369
0.1629
-0.9391
0.0347
-2.0057
-0.1562
-0.7527

0.4592
0.7921
0.5915
0.8707
0.3588
0.9723
0.0451
0.8759
0.4543

0.0154
0.1944
-0.1268
-0.9170
0.1729
-0.1001
-0.1108
0.0205
0.1023

0.4964
0.1683
0.8182
1.5170
1.8748
0.7571
1.1756
0.8738
1.1524

0.0311
-0.5848
0.5369
2.1550
-0.3904
0.4675
0.3744
0.0121
-0.5800

0.9752
0.5590
0.5915
0.0315
0.7008
0.6402
0.7167
0.9903
0.5641

Notes: Sample period Monday 6 January 1958 to Friday 30 December 2005. Days refers to the number of trading days; means before (after) election are daily returns for the week
before (after) the Saturday election. Levene’s test of equality of variances determines whether the test for equality of means assumes equal or unequal variances. Tests of equality of
means one week before and after election are against all other days during that government. Mc-Ewen is included with Holt, McMahon is included with Gorton. Howard remains in
government at the end of the sample period. Liberal-National refers to the Menzies, Holt-McEwen, Gorton-McMahon, Fraser and Howard governments.

Table 3
Estimated coefficients and standard errors of political cycle models
Dependent
variable
Nominal
returns
Nominal
return
volatility
Real
returns
Real
return
volatility

Variable
Coefficient/statistic
Standard error
p-value
Coefficient/statistic
Standard error
p-value
Coefficient/statistic
Standard error
p-value
Coefficient/statistic
Standard error
p-value

LiberalNational
0.0533
0.0251
0.0334
0.5289
0.0346
0.0000
0.0432
0.0251
0.0852
0.5288
0.0346
0.0000

Labor
0.0477
0.0272
0.0800
0.7749
0.0282
0.0000
0.0316
0.0272
0.2464
0.7748
0.0282
0.0000

Trend

Trend
squared

Before
election

-4.22E-05
5.44E-05
0.4377
2.34E-04
7.50E-05
0.0018
-4.88E-05
5.43E-05
0.3693
2.34E-04
7.50E-05
0.0018

1.32E-08
2.30E-08
0.5649
-1.09E-07
3.10E-08
0.0005
1.66E-08
2.30E-08
0.4689
-1.09E-07
3.10E-08
0.0004

0.0970
0.0830
0.2429
0.0024
0.0804
0.9760
0.0954
0.0829
0.2501
0.0024
0.0804
0.9759

After
election
-0.0656
0.1283
0.6091
0.0570
0.0939
0.5439
-0.0669
0.1288
0.6035
0.0570
0.0939
0.5438

BreuschGodfrey

White

Joint
test

Equality
test

1.52E+05
–

14.2714
–

2.7267
–

0.0582
–

0.0000
1.52E+05
–

0.0000
3.2056
–

0.0120
637.7383
–

0.8094
55.5420
–

0.0000
1.79E+02
–

0.0000
14.2705
–

0.0000
1.3136
–

0.0000
0.2431
–

0.0000
1.52E+05
–
0.0000

0.0015
3.5885
–
0.0000

0.2470
637.6852
–
0.0000

0.6220
55.5350
–
0.0000

Notes: Sample period Monday 6 January 1958 to Friday 30 December 2005. Breusch-Godfrey – Breusch-Godfrey serial correlation LM test for ordinary least
squares regression model, White – White heteroskedasticity test for ordinary least squares regression model. All standard errors and p-values incorporate
Newey-West corrections for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of unknown form. Joint test – F-statistic and significance of null hypothesis that all
coefficients are zero. Equality test – Wald statistic and significance of null hypothesis that estimated coefficients for Liberal-National minus Labor equals zero.

